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 Abstract 
Capital intensive industries in specialized niches of production have constituted 
solid ground for family firms in Spain, as evidenced by the experience of the 
iron and steel wire industries between 1870 and 2000. The embeddedness of 
these firms in their local and regional environments have allowed the creation 
of networks that, together with favourable institutional conditions, significantly 
explain the dominance of family entrepreneurship in iron and steel wire 
manufacturing in Spain, until the end of the 20th century. Dominance of family 
firms at the regional level has not been an obstacle for innovation in wire 
manufacturing in Spain, which has taken place even when institutional 
conditions blocked innovation and traditional networking. Therefore, economic 
theories about the difficulties dynastic family firms may have to perform 
appropriately in science-based industries must be questioned. 
JEL Classification: N63, N64, N83, N84 
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Resum 
Les empreses familiars han estat a l´Estat espanyol protagonistes de nínxols 
d´especialització en indústries capital intensives com les indústries del metall 
que fabriquen productes llargs, i així ho demostra el cas de les indústries del 
filferro entre 1870 i 2000. La integració de les empreses familiars en els seus 
entorns locals i regionals, la creació de xarxes personals i condicions 
institucionals favorables, expliquen el predomini del “capitalisme familiar” en 
el filferro a Espanya. Les evidències per aquest subsector qüestionen la validesa 
d´algunes teories econòmiques que argumenten les dificultats que les empreses 
familiars tenen per aconseguir ser centenàries en indústries d´alt contingut 
científic i tecnològic. 
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 Networks of People in Specialty Production: Family Firms in the Iron and 
Steel Wire Industries in Spain (1870-2000)  1
 
1.  Introduction 
      
    Specialty production and innovation are increasingly identified with 
geographical concentration and relationship between applied scientific 
knowledge and entrepreneurship, particularly –though not always- when 
favourable institutional conditions prevail.2
    Recent literature about the Spanish industrialization between the late 18th 
century and the end of the 20th century confirms that specialization and 
innovation have often been developed by small and medium workshops and 
factories in some peripheral regions and cities of the country, and Madrid. Big 
corporate firms in Spain have been rather the exception than the rule.3  The 
reasons that explain this persistence of family capitalism are not peculiar to 
Spain, but common to other countries, and must be related to the importance of 
                                                 
1 A draft with some of the ideas of this article was presented at the Joint Business History 
Conference–European Business History Association Meeting in Lowell, Massachusetts, June 
2003. Comments received in Lowell from Philip Scranton, Robert Forrant, Jeff Fear, David 
Kirtsch, Agnes Pogany and Francesca Antolin have contributed to improve the organization 
and ideas, though the usual disclaimer of final responsibility should be applied. I also 
acknowledge financial support from Spanish Research Projects DGICYT (PB94-0892), 
DGES (PB97-0931, PB98-1265, PB97-0875, PB98-1167), and the 2003 “Ayuda a la 
Investigación” from Fundación Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria.  
2 Scranton (1997), Sabel and Zeitlin (1997), Rose (2000), Parsons and Rose (2004), Colli 
(1999).  
3 Nadal dir (2003), Carreras y Tafunell (1993), y Tirado Fabregat (2002). 
 2 
 the locality and the region in entrepreneurship, and to institutional conditions 
that protected SMEs.4  
     This article aims first of all at contributing to a better understanding of the 
persistence of family entrepreneurship in Spain, in a specialized sector which 
was iron and steel wire manufacturing. Secondly, and on another ground, it also 
wants to contribute to recent theoretical literature about the difficulties family 
firms would have in science-based industries. Thus, according to some 
economic models about family firm performance, family firms with high 
requirements of capital and technology only with difficulties could have been 
“dynastic” family firms, and therefore very rarely could survive several 
generations of owners and managers linked by kinship ties.5 Available literature 
about family firm performance in Europe in the second half of the 20th century 
tends to question this assertion with many empirical evidences.6 For Spain, 
studies about the pharmaceutical and perfume industries in Spain have already 
stressed the innovative character of specialized family firms.7 This article adds 
more new evidences about the flexibility and innovation in capital intensive 
family firms of the iron and steel wire industries like Rivière and Quijano. The 
study also presents some explanations related to the creation of personal and 
entrepreneurial networks and the influence of institutional conditions. 
                                                 
4 Colli, Fernández Pérez and Rose (2003).   
5 Casson (1999).  
6 Rose (2000), Parsons and Rose (2004); Becattini, Pyke and Segenberger (1992). 
7 Núria Puig has published several works about the perfume and pharmaceutical industries. 
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 From the mid nineteenth century until the end of the twentieth century the 
overwhelming majority of firms in Spanish steelwire manufacturing have been 
owned and managed by families. Available information about surviving family 
firms suggest these families regularly invested in knowledge transfer and 
innovation from the late 19th to the late 20th century, even when institutional 
conditions blocked such transfer. In a few cases, some of these family firms 
actively cooperated among them to reduce transaction and information costs, 
and remove or reduce institutional difficulties.  Therefore, a third contribution 
of this article is to reveal the importance that “networks of people” have had in 
maintaining family firms in this industrial sector. As M. Casson and other 
authors have rightly indicated, the concept of networks when applied to social 
sciences must consider not only a potential cooperative side, but also often 
often subordination and struggle when networks link unequal elements.8
 
2.   Spanish Firms in Iron and Steel Wire Manufacturing 
     
       Families in steel wire production are commonly found in Western Europe 
until at least the late 1970s. Spain’s wire-manufacturing firms differed from 
those in other European countries like Belgium and Italy mainly in size, 
geographic concentration, chronology of technological innovation, and 
                                                 
8 Casson (2005). 
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 markets.9 Regarding size, most Spanish firms between the 1870s and the 1970s 
remained small, with less than 100 employees, and a few grew to medium size 
(100-1000 employees) during the twentieth century. Concentration in the 
1980s-1990s took place in the industry: a major leading holding company 
appeared that surpassed 1,000 employees with absorbed medium firms 
(Compañía Española de Laminados S.A., CELSA, owned by the Catalan 
Rubiralta brothers).  
           As for geographic distribution, whereas steel wire firms have been 
highly concentrated in a few industrial districts in some regions of Italy, 
Germany, and Belgium, Spanish wireworks were located in separated and very 
different regions of the North and NorthEastern periphery (Asturias, Cantabria, 
Basque Country, Catalonia). Besides, and with the exception of the Quijano 
firm in Los Corrales de Buelna (Cantabria), the regional territory that surrounds 
wire manufacturing centers in Spain has not heavily depended on the steel wire 
industry for local employment or GDP formation, in contrast with the Italian 
and Belgium cases. 
    Two final contrasts regarding other European steel wire firms are the 
chronology of technological innovation and market orientation. The German 
village of Altena started the first major innovation to mechanize wire 
production in the XVIth century (the wiredrawing bench with waterpower), 
which was transferred to France, Italy, the United Kingdom, and Northern 
                                                 
9 Colli (1999).  
 5 
 villages of Spain between the XVIIth and the XVIIIth centuries. Continuous 
wire machines, and looms for continuous wirecloth, powered with electricity 
started to be made in these countries in the 1870s-1880s by well-known firms 
like Wafios or Irmischer. These machines were fundamental to achieve mass 
production of iron and steel wires and also different kinds of wirecloth. The 
next important innovation was to mass produce very fine wires for high-tech 
products, and pieces made of tungsten (like the “widia”, invented by the Krupp 
firm in the interwar years) just allowed that in the 1930s and above all in the 
1940s.  
    In the case of Spain, and more particularly in the above-mentioned Northern 
regions, technological innovations generally were transferred from France, 
Germany, and the United Kingdom, and innovation took place rather in the 
process of adapting foreign techniques to local needs and designing new 
commercial and manageurial habits. The wiredrawing bench with water power 
arrived in the second half of the XVIIIth century, continuous wire machines and 
looms for continuous metal cloth in the 1910s-1920s, and the widia to produce 
cheap fine wires in the 1950s. Regarding markets, Spanish firms concentrated 
on selling to the national market and avoided expanding into markets outside 
the country, at least until the 1980s, when Spain became completely integrated 
into the European market. Their Spanish clients, for example, enjoyed flexible 
payment conditions that sometimes forced firms to finance their customers, 
jeopardizing their investment possibilities. Transportation and communication 
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 difficulties were additional problems for Spanish exports. Because of the 
obstacles, only a small percentage of Spanish steel wire production was sold to 
foreign markets, particularly to Latin America, from the 1870s until the 1970s. 
After the 1970s the industrial crisis and the economic integration in Europe in 
1986 modified the structure of the steelwire industries, and exports started to be 
more competitive in the European markets, and experienced a significant 
increase -although in general with percentages over production (30-35% in 
leading firms) that were lower than those corresponding to Italian or German 
competitors (up to 60-70% in leading firms)-. 
    The sector expanded in Spain modestly in the nineteenth century, growing 
from fourteen wire-weaving workshops and factories  (telas metálicas) in 1856 
to thirty in 1891 (sixteen of these were in Barcelona); by 1900 there were forty-
five manufacturers engaged in  wire weaving and forty-three  producing 
rejillas, or thinner wire mesh. Production increased in the twentieth century; by 
1915 there were nineteen steel-wire producers, thirty-two cable producers, 
thirty-seven manufacturers of wire nails, and twenty-eight wire weavers. Until 
the late 1890s, Spain’s consumption of the raw material required for this 
industry depended heavily on imports from France, Germany, and Great 
Britain.10  Spanish wire manufacturing achieved the pinnacle of production 
between 1968 and 1974 but was hard hit by the oil crisis of 1974–76.11 Many 
                                                 
10 Colli  (1999). The strong growth of the wire nail sector in the U.S at the end of the 19th 
century in Lamoreaux (1985). 
11Nadal, dir., (2003), p. 278, table III.3.1.6. 
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 family firms were unable to remain independent during the 1970s. By the 1980s 
and 1990s, many long-established companies had been bought by larger firms, 
partly because they were unable to survive the economic slump and partly 
because they could not adapt to the changes in the economic environment that 
accompanied Spain’s inclusion in the European Union after 1986. Excess 
production, labor problems, inability to expand their operations into other 
countries, and failure to plan for leadership succession resulted in the 
absorption of family businesses like Quijano and Rivière by Global Steel Wire 
(GSW), a family firm created in the 1960s.12 In 2000 GSW, controlled by 
CELSA (Compañía Española de Laminados S.A.) of the Catalan Rubiralta 
brothers,13 was leading the ranking of Spanish firms of the sector.  
How do we explain the survival of many of Spain’s regionally based family 
firms for such a long period of time in a sector that had elsewhere been 
dominated by vertical integration, corporate structure, and world financial 
markets?14 How did  wire manufacturers manage  to succeed in a 
technologically backward country endowed with few natural resources, and 
lacking enough capital to finance imports of raw material and support 
                                                 
12 An approach with the Rivière firm case, in Fernández-Pérez (1999). 
13 2002 sales of Global Steel Wire are 200 M. euros; workforce 537; wire rod production 
700,000 Tons. See www.globalsteelwire.com/compania/datos/datos.html. The historical 
family firms specialized in wire rod and its derivatives (wires, woven wire, cords, strands, 
meshes, jetties, cold heading screws, steel cord….) now under GSW control are Trefileria 
Moreda SA, Trefilerias Quijano SA, Trenzas y Cables SL, Trefileria Franco-Española, 
Rivière SA. Most of them were bought by the Rubiralta holding group between the 1980s-
2002. 
14 Casson (1984). On the problems to achieve vertical integration in Spanish distribution of 
metal products, see Martínez Ruiz (1998). 
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 expansion into international markets? Wire manufacturers benefited from a 
combination of institutional conditions and personal networking.  I will look at 
each of these factors in turn. 
 
II  Institutional conditions  
    During the 19th century and until the 1880s the introduction of metal imports 
had a very benign tariff system that allowed technology transfer. However, at 
the end of the 19th century metal manufacturers had already acquired 
capabilities to imitate and in some products even innovate what they previously 
imported. Spanish metal manufacturing in some regions developed, and some 
firms even exported to the Spanish Caribbean market of Puerto Rico and Cuba. 
When Spain lost these Caribbean markets after 1898, and when the agricultural 
crisis of these ending years of the 19th century decreased domestic sales, 
medium-sized wire manufacturers of the northern regions of Spain started to 
associate at the regional level, and joined forces to try to obtain from the State 
in Madrid effective tariff measures to protect their industries and reduce foreign 
competition. The State was sensible to some of these claims, as it also was for 
other industrialists like the metal producers. The government revised the 
relatively liberal tariffs that had been in place since 1869.15 Spanish foreign-
trade statistics reveal that the average tariff on iron wires, nets, and springs rose 
                                                 
15 Sáez García (2005). 
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 from between 20 percent to 25 percent of the value of imports in 1854 to 40 
percent in 1900.16   
     After lobbying successfully to establish new tariffs, in 1891, 1906, and 1921, 
the steel-wire manufacturers consolidated former regional clubs and 
associations to ensure that the effect of the new laws was to stimulate import 
substitution and reserve the Spanish market for Spanish manufacturers.17 The 
Central de Productores de Alambres y Puntas (Central Association of Wire and 
Nail Producers) in the northern regions and the Unión de Fabricantes (Union of 
Manufacturers of Wire Derivatives) in Catalonia eventually united, forming a 
cartel in 1925. Cartels, as next section indicates, were not prohibited in Spain, 
and proliferated in these years either in capital intensive or labour intensive 
sectors.  
    The unpublished letters of François Rivière Bonneton and of his grandson, 
Francisco Luis Rivière Manén, reveal that, between 1891 and 1925, the new 
tariffs, technology transfer, and investment in innovative methods boosted 
                                                 
16 Ministerio de Hacienda, Dirección General de Aduanas. Estadística General del Comercio 
Exterior de España (1854), (1900) and (1934).   
17 Arxiu Històric del Fomento del Trabajo Nacional in Barcelona. Francisco Rivière, “Telas 
metálicas”, in Contestación al Voto Particular del Excmo. Sr. Don Segismundo Moret 
Prendergast al Dictamen de la Comisión Arancelaria. Barcelona, Tipografía Hispano-
Americana, 1891, pp. 31-50. Memoria leída en la Junta General Ordinaria de Socios 
celebrada el dia 29 de enero de 1893. Barcelona, Imprenta de Henrich y Cia, 1893. Memoria 
leída en la Junta General Ordinaria de socios celebrada el dia 26 de enero de 1896. 
Barcelona, Tipografía Española, 1896. Memoria leída en la Junta General Ordinaria de 
socios de 31 de enero de 1904. Barcelona, Imprenta de Domingo Casanovas, 1904. 
Agrupación de Industrias Siderúrgicas y Metalúrgicas del Fomento del Trabajo Nacional. 
Memoria de los trabajos realizados hasta la fecha por la actual Junta Directiva leída en la 
Junta General celebrada el 13 de mayo de 1909. 
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 Spanish production of steel wire.18 The Spanish cartel lobbied to maintain tariff 
protection throughout the 1920s, a decade when investment in public 
infrastructure was increasing and industry was expanding under the umbrella of 
new protectionist industrial laws. Records of meetings and private gatherings 
from the Spanish public and private archives confirm that relations between the 
state and the metal producers during this period were cordial.19  
    The Spanish Civil War (1936–1939) interrupted these arrangements, and the 
cartel firms’ new strategies were undermined by Franco’s autarkic policies 
initiated in 1939. Between 1938 and 1975 Franco´s dictatorship changed the 
rules of the game for entrepreneurship in Spain. Public intervention enormously 
modified the strategies of private firms. In some sectors the State created firms 
to compete with the private initiative, foreign investment was prohibited or 
drastically reduced (until 1959), and new institutions were imposed to mediate 
between the entrepreneurs and the State and between entrepreneurs and 
workers.20 Thus, for example, in 1941 the state created a public holding 
organization, Instituto Nacional de Industria (I.N.I.), in which to invest its funds 
for a new industrial policy.  It forced some private firms in the transportation 
industries to sell a controlling portion to I.N.I. and established new firms in this 
sector, in the energy, iron, and steel industries, and in the chemical industry, 
                                                 
18 Unpublished letters of François Rivière Bonneton and unpublished memoirs of Francisco 
Luis Rivière Manén, Historical Archive of Francisco Rivière Ribas in Barcelona.  
19 Archivo Militar de Segovia. Legajos de la Comisión de Movilización Industrial, 1916-
1921. Memorias. 
20 Sánchez and Tascón, eds. (2003). 
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 which had the effect of concentrating scarce resources in a few capital-intensive 
industries. 21
    Major steel-wire firms did not experience competition from the new public 
industrial holding, in part because their owners had friends in the Franco regime 
and in part because wire manufacturing had less strategic importance than 
heavy metal production. I.N.I. did not bother to impose control over the steel-
wire firms. The impact  of the state’s attempt to control heavy industry in the 
1940s and 1950s, while negative for much of Spanish industry, allowed the 
wire manufacturers, by contrast, to develop unhindered (though with higher 
costs when raw materials had to be bought to inefficient public industries).  
      A factor that benefited Spain’s large steelwire firms, such as Quijano, 
Moreda, and Rivière, during the 1950s and 1960s, was that wiring was required 
in critically important industrial sectors, such as building construction (which 
utilized mesh, cables, and nets), the automobile industry (which needed springs 
for seats and reinforced cables for pneumatic tires), and telecommunications 
and electronics (which used cables and filters). Production was pushed by 
strong demand and a favorable institutional environment, and by the 
technological requirements of the updated processes installed in the 1960s. 
However, overcapacity and a bloated labor force soon impeded the growth of 
the domestic market. While, on the one hand, their integration into world 
markets enabled Spanish wire manufacturers to acquire modern technology and 
                                                 
21 Nadal, dir. (2003). 
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 enjoy increased demand, on the other hand, they  had to contend with rigid 
Francoist labor policies, which protected permanent employment so that firms 
could not reduce or restructure their labour forces, at the expense of maintaining 
low salaries in a very inflationary period.  
    In 1974 new legislation directed the four major steel-wire producers, 
Quijano, Rivière, Moreda, and Echevarría, to reduce production in exchange for 
tax benefits. The legislation was passed in order to compel the industry to 
“rationalize” and curtail its output as a way of ensuring its survival. However, 
the legislation did not include measures that would force the companies to cut  
production costs and reorganize their management practices.22 Tariff rates, high 
before the Spanish Civil War,  were prohibitive in the 1940s and early 1950s, a 
result of  Francoist isolationism. The Stabilization Plan of 1959 launched  a new 
period. Integration into the European market in 1986 meant convergence with 
European tariffs, allowing imports to flow into the country. .  
    To sum up, the State between the 1870s and the 1970s indirectly or directly 
benefited the dominance of some family firms in the Spanish steelwire industry. 
First of all, by being sensible to their claims for tariff protection in critical 
market conditions at the end of the 19th century. Then, by openly allowing a few 
firms to control the domestic market with cartel agreements in the 1920s. The 
support was carried out without calculating the costs that a heavily concentrated 
                                                 
22 Acción Concertada de la Siderurgia-Trefilería. Estadísticas de capacidad productiva 
pertenecientes a Quijano, Echevarría, Rivière y Moreda, 1974-1978, Historical Archive of 
Francisco Rivière Ribas in Barcelona.. 
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 and not always technologically advanced industry could have on market prices.     
After the Civil War (1936-39), during Franco´s dictatorship (1939-1975)  the 
creation of an industrial public sector, and the imposition of new rules in the 
relationship between the State, the entrepreneurs, and the workers, imposed 
either serious restrictions and drawbacks or benefits to the family firms in the 
wire manufacturing industry. Some examples of the negative impact the new 
State had on the sector were technological backwardness (by limiting 
technology transfer from abroad until 1959), high prices in raw materials and 
energy, and restrictions to their previous freedom to manage labour conditions. 
However, the benefits steel wire family firms obtained from State intervention 
in the 1940s-1970s appear also quite clear: as in other economic activities 
“peace” in labour relations was aggressively achieved and guaranteed by 
suppressing pre-civil war traditional unions and associations, and possible 
competitors were legally expelled until the 1960s (with laws that reduced 
imports and foreign capital investment, and other laws that since 1939 
arbitrarily controlled the number and size of new industrial establishments in 
Spain). The few family firms that survived the civil war and established closed 
ties with the new regime, significantly influenced Franco´s institutions in order 
to reduce competitors, receive special tax reductions, and maintain a reserved 
domestic market. These conditions help understand family dominance in these 
years in the Spanish steelwire industry, a sector which was experiencing an 
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 increase in financial capital, corporate management and transnational ownership 
in other Western economies.  
      After 1959, but above all after Franco´s death, the new democratic 
governments started a structural reform of the Spanish industry and the Spanish 
economy that affected foreign trade and taxes, among other aspects. In the late 
1970s death duties paid by family firms affected by generational succession 
rose impressively up to a maximum of 50 per cent of the value to be 
transmitted, and new taxes on wealth were imposed, in coincidence with the 
years of the strong impact of the industrial crisis in Spain. The result of both 
critical changes  was a high death rate of family firms in Spain that also 
affected, in the 1980s and 1990s, steel wire family firms like Quijano and 
Moreda (bought by Global Steel Wire-CELSA of the Catalan Rubiralta 
brothers) and Rivière (bought by a group of Spanish investors led by Manuel 
Varela Mato in 1979). 
 
III- Networks of People 
       Another factor contributing to the persistence of family-owned firms in the 
wire-drawing industry was the development of strong personal networks 
between individual manufacturers and their families and friends. Cooperation 
was critical to the survival and growth of these firms, although the forms it took 
changed with shifts in market dynamics and in the institutional environment.  
 15 
        During the last two decades of the nineteenth century a combination of 
declining agricultural prices and industrial sales in the countryside led many 
entrepreneurs to unite forces. The objective was first to establish regular 
institutional forms of cooperation and knowledge transfer, and parallel to that to 
have a stronger voice in their conversations with State representatives in order 
to achieve protection against foreign competition. In 1889-1891 metal 
manufacturers started to associate at a regional level with these aims.23 The 
tradition of cooperation among small and medium-sized firms stretched back 
for centuries, and was particularly strong in the metal districts located in 
Barcelona and Catalonia and in the industrial districts of the Basque province of 
Guipúzcoa. Cooperation took the form of trade associations that facilitated the 
spread of technical knowledge among their members, and of educational 
centers. Cooperation among the leading firms of the metal transformation 
activities, between the 1880s and the 1920s, took place at a regional level but in 
contrast with the smaller firms it also took place at State level and included as a 
main objective to exert political pressure to obtain protection from foreign 
competition. In this second case, as we have just seen in the previous section, 
cooperation often meant pressure to obtain from the State tax reductions for 
national products and tax increases for foreign products, and informal 
                                                 
23 On the evolution of formal and informal institutions of knowledge transfer in Spain since 
the 18th century, see Fernández and Puig (2004). 
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 agreements among firms to fix prices and divide the Spanish market in reserved 
areas for particular products of each firm. 
          Historically, capital-intensive sectors like iron, steel and concrete 
production have faced problems of overproduction and declining prices and, in 
many countries, producers have formed or tried to form cartels in order to 
overcome these difficulties.  In Spain, and during the first three decades of the 
twentieth century, these problems affected also light metal transformation 
industries, and as an example major firms in steel wire and wire  manufactures 
created their own State-level cartel in 1925. Cartels were never prohibited in 
Spain, and they appeared in the first three decades of the 20th century in 
concrete production, maritime transport, beer production, metal production, the 
distribution of commercial irons and steels, and in steelwire production, to 
name only a few sectors that have received research and publications.24  
           The creation of cartels was the result of previous associationist activities, 
that adopted a new form in changing market circumstances. In her study of the 
merger movement in the United States in the late nineteenth century, Naomi 
Lamoreaux has suggested that firms within capital-intensive sectors that 
dominated slowly growing, stable markets had few reasons to form associations 
until they were faced with a sudden change in market conditions. Such a sudden 
                                                 
24 Gómez Mendoza (1987); González Portilla (1985). About the role of the State in the 
creation of a cartel in the beer industry in Spain in the 1940s, and in maritime transportation 
in the 1950s, Torres Villanueva (2003). About cartels in iron and steel production, and also in 
the commercialization of commercial iron and steel in Spain in the interwar period references 
in Fernández Pérez (2004), chapters 1-4. 
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 change occurred in Spain at the end of the nineteenth century, when Spain lost 
the Caribbean islands of Cuba and Puerto Rico after the Spanish-American 
War. This affected the Quijano and Rivière firms, which had been exporting 
around 10 percent of their products to these markets.25 At the same time, in the 
domestic market, wire manufactures were suffering from falling prices in 
agriculture, the main sector of the Spanish economy, and the prices of raw 
materials needed to produce wire products were being pushed up by European 
protectionist measures.26  
         These events triggered the formation of associations, which tried to 
influence state policy in the direction of protective legislation.  Thus, the 
Catalan Fomento del Trabajo Nacional (translated as Promotion of National 
Work, although it was composed of entrepreneurs, not workers) established a 
special branch of associated metal firms between 1889 and 1891. François 
Rivière Bonneton, for one, whose firm, Rivière, was a member, wrote letters 
and pamphlets. In a thirty-page report, the manufacturers appraised the Spanish 
government of the impact of imports, production, and prices on the metal 
sector, arguing against the liberal tariffs that had been in place since 1869. They 
urged legislators in Madrid to add conditions to the 1891 tariff that would raise 
                                                 
25 Historical Archive of the Barcelona Chamber of Commerce. 
26  Metal manufacturers of the Tarragona area indicated prices of iron tripled as a direct effect 
of the I WW. See Arnavat (1987), 114. I must acknowledge my colleague Ramon Ramon for 
kindly providing me a copy of this book. 
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 the price of imports of wire products, thereby protecting the sector in Spain.27 
Northwestern entrepreneurs, led by Quijano’s founder, José María Quijano, 
pressed regional entrepreneurs to unite behind efforts to pass favorable 
legislation and increase protection.  
            These associations drew in entrepreneurs from several regions. Personal 
networking resulted in more private -even secret- agreements regarding market 
distribution and price fixing, which were made outside the arena of political 
debate.  Neither kinship or friendship were here the basis for networking, nor 
belonging to similar regional or cultural backgrounds. In fact Francisco Luis 
Rivière Manén in his private unpublished memoirs says that the leading 
members of each family in charge of signing the cartel agreement in 1925 had 
opposing personalities and did not like each other. Contrary to what Mark 
Granovetter´s theoretical arguments say about the formation of business groups, 
these agreements among regional business groups in the Spanish steelwire 
industry had, more than a cultural basis, an economic basis.28
                                                 
27  Rivière Manén (1954), indicates that Francisco Rivière Bonneton was the autor of the 
section about woven wires (Telas Metalicas) in the Catalan answer to the rise of tariffs in 
semi-elaborates and metal manufactures -that could protect iron & steel production but was 
perceived as a damage to metal transformation-. The whole discourse, including the defense 
about woven wires, in Contestación al voto particular del Excmo. Sr. D. Segismundo Moret y 
Prendergast al dictamen de la Comisión Arancelaria (Barcelona, 1891), preserved in the 
historical archive of Fomento del Trabajo Nacional. The Catalan associates wrote their 
arguments in this debate, but also travelled to Madrid twice to talk with politicians. 
Agrupación de Industrias Siderúrgicas y Metalúrgicas del Fomento del Trabajo Nacional, 
Memoria de los trabajos realizados hasta la fecha por la actual Junta Directiva, leída en la 
Junta General celebrada el 13 de mayo de 1909, p. 6) 
28 Granovetter (1992), 3–11, and Granovetter (1995), 93–130. 
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              Agreements initially occurred between two firms producing 
complementary products.  Soon, however, these private agreements became 
multilateral, and the signatories included companies engaged in similar 
branches of production. The signers’ goal was to control the markets in their 
own and adjoining regions, and the Spanish market was apportioned among the 
parties to avoid open competition among major firms. Another reason for the 
firms’ willingness to negotiate was that technological innovation and 
improvements in transportation were reducing production costs and prices while 
the number of competitors in Spain remained stable (though they were 
increasing abroad).29 When Basque iron and steel producers began to integrate 
the manufacture of wire and wire derivatives, manufacturers in Cantabria and 
Catalonia, which had only a few wire-rod factories and steel furnaces, 
experienced a diminished supply of raw materials. The firms in these two 
regions then started their own cooperative movement, forming associations to 
ensure regular shipments of the wire-rod they needed to stay competitive.30 In 
the late 1890s, Quijano agreed to provide Rosés with 1,500 annual tons of the 
wire it needed to produce nails, in exchange for Quijano’s promise not to sell its 
                                                 
29 Archivo Histórico de Francisco Rivière Ribas in Barcelona. F.L. Rivière Manén, 
unpublished Memorias, vol. II. 
30 In Quijano’s historical archive there are documents in which José María Quijano, the 
founder, said that he started producing wire rod and establishing contacts with Catalan wire 
derivatives producers in a multilateral scale when Basque iron & steel producers (Alambres 
del Cadagua, Castrejana) started to manufacture wire and when traditional Basque providers 
of wire-rod (palanquilla) like Altos Hornos and La Vizcaya reduced the quantities sent to 
Quijano. Summarized in Bustamante Quijano (1986),180. Quijano said he did not want to 
compete in Catalonia with Rosés selling the nails both produced because of friendship, and 
he did not build a factory he had in mind in Barcelona in 1899-1900 for this reason 
(Bustamante Quijano, 1986, 183). 
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 own nails in Rosés’ territory, which encompassed eastern, central, and southern 
Spain.31 Another agreement, regarding woven wire products for the 
papermaking industry, was worked out between 1898 and 1902 and signed by 
the Catalan Rivière company and the Navarrese company, Perot.32  Still another 
arrangement, between Marull and Rivière, that fixed prices of triple-twist 
grillworks, lasted for eight years, from 1902 to 1910.33  
           The first multilateral agreement, which was signed by Catalan, Asturian, 
and Cantabrian entrepreneurs who feared competition from the Basque region, 
grew out of a series of meetings held in 1907 in Barcelona. The Union de 
Fabricantes de Alambres, (Union of Wire Manufacturers) comprising six 
Catalan firms of wire entrepreneurs, and a northwestern association, Central de 
Fabricantes de Alambres y Puntas led by José María Quijano, reached 
agreements of production for individual products on the basis of the percentage 
of sales each firm could make of a particular product.   
          Although the two regional associations represented competing firms, their 
members were determined to remain independent, and thus they were willing to 
cooperate with each other in order to avoid being absorbed. Another agreement, 
signed in October 1925 in San Sebastian, resulted in the creation of a national 
cartel, Sociedad Anónima de Trefilería y Derivados, comprising seven 
independent firms from Catalonia, Asturias, Basque Country and Cantabria, 
                                                 
31 Rivière Manén (1954), 162. 
32 Rivière Manén (1954), 184. 
33 Calvo Calvo (1985), vol. 1, 177-179. 
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 under the leadership of Juan José Quijano (representing the second generation 
of the family firm Quijano of Santander) and the Rivière Chavany brothers 
(also representing the second generation, in this case of the family firm Rivière 
from Barcelona).34  
          The Spanish Civil War (1936–1939) interrupted this process of inter-
regional cooperation, just as it had interrupted technological innovation. We 
have more information for this period for one particular Catalan firm, Rivière 
S.A.. This family firm founded in 1854 was unable to match its 1929 level of 
production—its highest—until 1953.35 The factories were taken over by the 
Republican government in 1937 and controlled by the anarchist group, 
Confederación Nacional del Trabajo, or National Confederation of Work 
(C.N.T.) until 1939, when the family took control again. The Rivières’ Catholic 
connections (they had attended Jesuit schools and had a network of Jesuit 
friends based in Barcelona) enabled them to start new businesses in Pamplona 
and San Sebastian with the support of Catholic entrepreneurs who had also been 
uprooted by the war. Other members of the family called upon their French 
origins, moving to France to stay with relatives in Pau in southern France. The 
family used its network of friends and relatives to build relationships with 
individuals who came to enjoy top-level positions in the Francoist dictatorship 
                                                 
34 Description of the process of constitution, products and firms involved, and percentages of 
market agreed, in F.L. Rivière Manén, unpublished Memorias, vol. 1, pp. 126-129 and 132. 
35 Historical Archive of Francisco Rivière Ribas. Carpeta 5. Rivière S.A.  
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 during the 1940s.36 These networks, created during the civil war years of 
political and economic turmoil, enabled the Rivières to regain its properties, 
obtain regular supplies of scarce wire-rod, boost production levels, and obtain 
important clients in the 1940s and 1950s. Some of these clients were the 
national railway company (RENFE), the national car producer SEAT 
(producing springs for the seats of the FIAT 1.400 model) and the U.S. military 
bases established in Spain, among others.37  
          The 1940s and 1950s witnessed, as we have already said, significant 
changes in the market conditions in Spain. As we indicated before, after the 
Spanish civil war Franco´s new regime started isolationist policies that meant a 
drastic fall of imports and foreign capital and technology. This new regime also 
imposed new institutions (strongly linked to State departments) to control 
labour relations in public and private firms. Very often entrepreneurs supported 
the changes, but in some regions and economic activities the State intervention 
was considered very inefficient and alternatives were sought. One of the most 
important examples of the latter was the Centro para el Estudio y 
Asesoramiento Metalúrgicos (C.E.A.M.) created in Barcelona in 1951. Its 
purpose was to train workers and executives of the metal industry in Catalonia, 
and to provide information about international markets and relevant state 
                                                 
36 Rivière Manén (1938), Tradición, Espíritu y Estilo de la Casa Rivière (Pamplona, 
unpublished). And from same author the already mentioned Memorias in 2 volumes with 
about 600 pages (Calella-Cardedeu-Barcelona, 1961-70, unpublished). Some details, in 
Puigdomènec Tey (1993). 
37 Interview to Francisco Rivière Ribas by the autor, in Barcelona, October 1996. 
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 policies. In the 1960s its members represented the most important medium and 
big metal firms in Catalonia.   
          Networks were critical to the survival of the two leading firms in the 
steelwire industry (Rivière and Quijano) in the 1940s and 1950s, when it was 
important to have contacts with groups and individuals occupying high-level 
positions in Madrid. Interruptions in regular supplies of raw materials, 
technology, and the international currency needed to pay for imports, resulting 
first from the upheaval of war and then from the harsh economic conditions 
imposed by the military dictatorship, impeded interregional cooperation during 
the 1940s.38 Each region’s firms decided in the 1940s to connect directly with 
the central government to obtain the now restricted imports and currency. After 
the war the state took a central role in distributing inputs to factories. 
         Firms found that it was more useful to communicate with the State and to 
intensify networks of cooperation with other firms of the same region than to 
keep networks with firms located in other regions -as they had been doing 
before the war-. Basque iron and steel producers reduced their sales to outside 
regions.39. Asturian and Cantabrian manufacturers had iron and steel furnaces, 
and used them to provide raw material to their regional wireworks. Catalan 
manufacturers, poor in iron, coal, and wire-rod, suffered the reduction of sales 
of raw materials from Basque and Asturian providers and intensified personal 
                                                 
38 Catalan (1995). 
39 According to testimonies of Catalan entrepreneurs in 1939 preserved in the Barcelona 
Chamber of Commerce. 
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 inter-firm contacts within the Catalan region, by pulling together financial 
resources from different family firms. Documents from the Rivière company 
and the Catalan family firms Roca and Torras offer testimony of these common 
efforts.40An early initiative, in 1942, was the creation of Siderúrgica Asturiana 
SA (SIASA), a firm that used the German Renn-Krupp process to produce low-
quality iron and steel in the Asturian mines of Avilés. SIASA was formed in 
Madrid, and it had factories in Asturias and partners in Catalonia and Asturias, 
but it was composed of the Catalan firms Torras Herrería y Construcciones, 
Aceros Calibrados M. Aracil Bonas, A. Bianchini Ingenieros Trefilería, Tubos 
y Perfiles SA, Metales y Platería Ribera SA, Rivière SA Trefilería, and Altos 
Hornos de Cataluña (bought by Rivière in 1942).41 A second postwar initiative 
was the joint acquisition of an old factory in Mieres, located in the important 
coal region of Asturias, by four Catalan metal firms: Rivière, Torras, Suñer-
Comercial de Laminados, and Roca. Neither initiative lasted very long, because 
the public industrial holding company INI bought out SIASA, and strong 
internal conflicts doomed the Mieres venture.42  
                                                 
40 See for the Rocas a summary in Fernández Pérez (2000). For the Can Torras dels Ferros, 
see Cabana and Feliu i Torras (1987), chapter 4. 
41 In 1942 works to start the factory in Aviles started, but the fall of the Nazi regime left 
technological transfer stopped, and INI bought a 20 per cent of its shares in November 18 
1948, while the Krupp firm kept also some percentage of property. By 1965 the Catalan firm 
Torras was the main shareowner with 20 per cent of the capital. In Cabana and Feliu (1987), 
150.  
42 About SIASA and the presence of INI, see Cabana and Feliu, chapter 4. About the Mieres 
story, Jaime Rivière Manén –who was direct witness and actor in the conflict- before his 
death a year ago kindly explained me his memories of this event, and provided me a copy of 
a confidential letter sent to him by the Spanish Vice-president José María Fernández 
Ladreda. According to these evidences and to F.L.Rivière Manén Memorias vol. 2 it seems 
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        From the mid-1950s to the late 1970s the character and goals of interfirm 
cooperation underwent, again, a qualitative shift. After 1953 and particularly 
1959 the Spanish government accepted the need to break the isolationist 
policies of the 1940s and slowly started to adopt more open international 
economic policies. Technology transfer and foreign investment accelerated as a 
consequence, and European and U.S. firms started to invest in Spain. To reduce 
the accumulated technological gap in the 1960s required heavy investments of 
capital, and leading family firms in the steel wire industry such as Rivière 
established limited partnerships with foreign leading family firms of the 
industry, preferring this kind of arrangement to the unwanted alternative of 
sharing ownership with unknown shareholders.  Francisco Luis Rivière Manén 
and Fernando Rivière Caralt, managers of Rivière, renewed old contacts with 
the transnational company Bekaert (owned by the Belgium Bekaert family). 
Leo Bekaert had initiated the personal friendship and entrepreneurial contacts 
with the Rivière family before IIWW. When Leo Bekaert died his son-in-law 
renewed their privileged commercial relations with Rivière. Besides looking 
again to European leading firms Spanish leading firms in the wire industries 
started to look with new eyes at unknown U.S. firms and manageurial models.. 
Some firms like Rivière had participated in productivity commissions and 
                                                                                                                      
that the “Catalan group” was deeply divided after the war regarding the different needs of 
raw materials and semi-elaborates. Firms more dependent upon raw materials, particularly 
the Roca Soler family and the Suñer Group, pressed in a violent way to obtain more 
percentages of such inputs than wire/wire derivatives producers like the Rivières. The 
conflict ended in personal hatred and strong economic losses for Rivières. 
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 travelled to the United States to visit IBM, Ford, and American steel-wire 
manufacturers in the late 1950s to observe first-hand examples of scientifically 
organized production. Bedaux methods started to be adapted to Catalonian 
industrial firms, by the Gombert consultant company and the Spanish engineers 
that enthusiastically adopted scientific organization methods. Again, Rivière 
pioneered the introduction of these methods in the Catalan steel wire industry 
with one of such engineers, Carmelo María Cabré Rabadá.43 The growth of 
wire-manufacturing production in these years was important.The total Spanish 
production of wire rose from 17,200 tons in 1922 to 178,800 tons in 1973.44  
The unpublished memoirs of Francisco Luis Rivière Manén show that the 
Rivière directors did not lose sight of the significance that technological 
innovation and regional networking during the war had, and they maintained 
close contacts with European and American universities and technical institutes. 
Rivière joined European associations whose aims were similar in order to join 
forces against competition from countries outside Europe, such as Japan and 
Korea. As we said, Rivière also adopted scientific methods of organizing 
production and management, following business practices that were 
transforming firms in other European countries as they adapted to a newly 
globalized economy. Rivière also established close networks with other 
                                                 
43 Unpublished Memoirs of Francisco Luis Rivière Manén, vol. 2, 1965-1971, Historical 
Archive Francisco Rivière Ribas.  
44 Private Archive of Francesc Cambo in Barcelona, Carpeta “Transformados metálicos” 
(1921-23). Private Archive Francisco Rivière Ribas in Barcelona, Acción Concertada 
Siderurgia-Trefilería 1974-78. 
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 entrepreneurs and with specialized regional institutes of management 
education.45  
 
IV Conclusions  
          Steel-wire manufacturing in Spain has been historically controlled by a 
few family firms until today, during well over one hundred and fifty years. The 
holding company Global Steel Wire–CELSA, which has absorbed the most 
important historical family firms (Quijano, Rivière, Moreda) is itself controlled 
by another family, the Rubiraltas, who owns around 60 percent of the holding.  
The family structure of ownership and control in Spanish wire manufacturing 
was facilitated, at least until the 1970s, by a combination of personal and 
regional networks of opportunity, and innovation, and favourable institutional 
conditions protecting family firm ownership. 
         Inter-firm and inter-regional networks of firms changed the mechanisms 
of relationship throughout this long period. As Casson has said, networks were 
sometimes about cooperation though sometimes were also about fierce 
competition. Between the end of the nineteenth century and 1936, 
entrepreneurial  associations tried  to protect themselves from foreign 
competition, while maintaining at the same time personal networks abroad to 
preserve knowledge transfer and innovation opportunities. After the Civil War 
and during Franco’s regime, the associations tried to shield themselves from the 
                                                 
45 Fernández-Pérez and Puig (2004), and Fernández-Pérez (1999). 
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 institutional difficulties that were created by the Spanish state. Franco’s 
ministers erected many obstacles to foreign investment in Spain during the 
1940s, but in the late 1950s they began to encourage foreign firms to invest, 
particularly after the Stabilization Plan was instituted in 1959. New agreements 
were designed then not to capture foreign markets but, rather, to preserve –
again- their own markets in Spain.  
            During the 1970s, Spanish wire manufacturers continued to abide by 
early agreements they had signed to safeguard their individual specialties and 
stave off competition. Thus, in 1925 the most important steel-wire 
manufacturers had created a cartel to ensure shares of the Spanish market for 
individual products. In 1974, four of the cartel’s surviving firms (Quijano, 
Rivière, Moreda, Echevarría) signed a private agreement reconfirming the 
network, this time with the main goal of gaining the tax benefits and favourable 
financial conditions conferred by recent legislation (the “Acciones 
Concertadas”).46 The success of a handful of family firms in a particular market 
niche no doubt meant steeper entrance costs for other companies and higher 
prices both for consumers and for sectors that relied on steel wire.  
           Political and economic conditions abruptly changed after the 1970s as 
Spain underwent the transition to democracy. Its integration into international 
institutions made it increasingly vulnerable to global economic crises, such as 
                                                 
46 Private Historical Archive of Francisco Rivière Ribas in Barcelona. Acción Concertada de 
la Siderurgia-Trefilería, 1974-1978. 
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 rising prices, overproduction, and competition from the United States and Asia. 
Older firms that were unable to adapt to the new conditions went bankrupt. 
Those that survived were bought by Global Steel Wire: Quijano and Moreda 
over the course of the 1980s and Rivière in 2000. Even with this acquisition, a 
Spanish family was able to control this industrial sector in a globalized market.  
              The historical evolution of the economy and the politics of the country 
highly determined the long dominance of family firms at regional level, in a 
branch of industry that invested greatly on satisfaction of local needs of their 
clients. Satisfaction of clients and personal relations between them and the 
manufacturers were another reason that helps explain the long life of family 
firms in a relatively capital intensive sector like the iron and steel wire 
industries. During the second half of the nineteenth century a very weak liberal 
State was not capable to create in Spain what we call today a national system of 
innovation, and Schumpeterian entrepreneurs interested in the iron wire 
industries (many of French origins) played a determinant role in transferring 
technology from abroad and establish these industries, in close connection with 
the needs of the local and regional clients. They produced first wire 
manufactures such as wirecloth, nails, or springs, and only in the late nineteenth 
century –when the Spanish iron industry also expanded- some firms started to 
produce iron and steel wires. This process was, as in other European countries, 
located in a few regions well endowed with natural resources and/or human 
capital like Cantabria, Asturias, Basque Country and Catalonia.  
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            Sudden and important changes in market conditions at the turn of the 
century made the entrepreneurs and the State get together to protect the industry 
from foreign competition with new tariffs between 1891 and 1921. The 
protection was expanded indirectly when the State allowed the creation of a 
cartel in 1925 that imposed prices in the Spanish market. Family firms 
associated and established personal networkings to be able to obtain these 
privileges, though often the basis for networking were neither kinship nor 
friendship nor cultural affinities but economic convenience. 
            After the Spanish Civil War institutional and economic conditions 
abruptly changed again. Franco´s dictatorship isolated Spain and increased the 
technological gap the country had with other developed economies. 
Commercial policicies strongly reduced imports and created obstacles for 
production. However, new industrial and labour legislation protected leading 
family firms in the steelwire industry that survived the civil war from domestic 
and international competition, until the industrial crisis of the late 1970s. U.S. 
new relations with Francoist Spain since the 1950s plus the effects of the 1959 
Stabilization Plan stimulated young heirs of big family firms to learn new 
organizational and business techniques to update their businesses and get 
global, abroad and in the new business schools. 
        During the 1970s the imposition of a modern tax system, in coincidence 
with a strong industrial crisis in 1978-1979, provoked financial problems to 
capital intensive family firms. This combination of problems, together with the 
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 new European support to Spanish industrial reforms, favoured strong changes in 
ownership that took place in the steelwire industry between 1980 and 2000. 
Strong, though not radical, cause new families took over and absorbed old ones, 
significantly blocking financial capital to control this specialized niche of 
production. Families unable to adapt flexibly, and rapidly, to the new 
challenges were forced to sell their century-old business to new families that 
were prepared and ready to rationalize activities and get global.  
          As in the case of the Italian clusters or the specialized production niches 
of the Spanish pharmaceutical and parfum industries, the example of the steel 
wire industries in Spain suggests that Mark Casson´s model about dynastic 
family firms in science-based industries does not fit well with empirical 
evidence. When specialty production, regional clusters, personal networks and 
institutional conditions combine, flexible family ownership structures can 
control for centuries a particular niche of a capital intensive industry.  
 
Referencias bibliográficas 
1. Arnavat, A. (1987), L´impacte de la primera guerra mundial sobre 
l´economia reusenca 1914-1923. 
2. Becattini, G.; Pyke, F. and Segenberger,W., eds., (1992), Los distritos 
industriales y las pequeñas empresas, Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad 
Social.  
 32 
 3. Bustamante Quijano, R. (1986) José María Quijano (Vida y obra de un 
hidalgo emprendedor), Nueva Montaña Quijano. 
4. Cabana,F. and Feliu i Torras, A. (1987) Can Torras dels Ferros 1865-
1985. Siderúrgia i construccions metal.liques a Catalunya,Tallers 
Gràfics Hostenchs. 
5. Calvo Calvo, A. (1985), La transformación de la estructura industrial en 
Cataluña 1898-1920, unpublished Ph.D. diss., Universitat de Barcelona. 
6. Carreras,A. and Tafunell,X. (1993) “La gran empresa en España”, 
Revista de Historia Industrial, 3, 127-176.  
7. Casson, M. (1984) “The theory of vertical integration: a survey and 
synthesis”, Journal of Economic Studies, vol. II, n.2, 3-43. 
8. Casson, M. (1999),“The Economics of the Family Firm”, Scandinavian 
Economic History Review, 47, pp. 10-23. 
9. Casson, M. (2005), “Economic Analysis of Social Networks”, X 
Symposium of Economic History “Analysis of Networks in Economic 
History”, 9 January 2005, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 
unpublished inaugural conference. 
10. Catalan, J. (1995), La economía española y la Segunda Guerra mundial, 
Ariel. 
11. Colli, A. (1999) “Networking the Market: Evidence and Conjecture from 
the History of the Italian Industrial Disctricts”, European Yearbook of 
Business History, vol. 1, pp. 75-92. 
 33 
 12. Colli, A. (1999) Legami di ferro. Storia del distretto metallurgico e 
meccanico lecchese tra Otto e Novecento, Donzelli. 
13. Colli, A.; Fernández Pérez, P. and Rose, M.B. (2003), “National 
Determinants of Family Firm Development? Family Firms in Britain, 
Spain and Italy during the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries”, 
Enterprise and Society, vol. 4, no. 1, 28-64. 
14. Fernández-Pérez,P. (1999) “La empresa familiar y el “sídrome de 
Buddenbrook” en la España contemporánea: el caso Rivière (1860-
1979)” in A. Carreras, P. Pascual, D. S. Reher and C. Sudrià, eds., 
Doctor Nadal. La industrialización y el desarrollo económico de España, 
Publicacions UB, vol. II, 1398-1414. 
15. Fernández Pérez,P. (2000), “Angela, Matías, Martín y Josep Roca Soler” 
in E. Torres coord. Los 100 empresarios españoles del siglo XX, LID.  
16. Fernández, P. and Puig, N. (2004), “Knowledge Transfer and Family 
Firms of the European Periphery: The Case of Spain, 18th-20th 
centuries” Business History. Vol. 41, 79-99. 
17. Fernández Pérez, P. (2004) Moreda (1879-2004) and Rivière (1854-
2004). Un siglo y medio de trefilería en España, MRT-Trivium. 
18. Gómez Mendoza, A. (1987), “La formación de un cartel en el primer 
tercio del siglo XX: la industria del cemento Pórtland”, Revista de 
Historia Económica, 2.  
 34 
 19. González Portilla, M. “Las nuevas siderurgias vascas y los primeros 
sindicatos (cárteles) siderúrgicos, 1886-1896” in Jose Luis García 
Delgado,ed., La España de la Restauración: política, economía, 
legislación y cultura.  
20. Granovetter, M. (1992), “Economic Institutions as Social Constructions: 
A Framework for Analysis,” Acta Sociologica 35 (1992): 3–11. 
21. Granovetter, M. (1995), “Coase Revisited: Business Groups in the 
Modern Economy,” Industrial and Corporate Change 4 (1995): 93–130. 
22. Lamoreaux, N. (1985) The Great Merger Movement in American 
Business, 1895-1904, Cambridge University Press. 
23. Martínez Ruiz, J.I. (1998), La Unión de Almacenistas de hierros y la 
distribución de hierros comerciales en España. Una aportación al 
estudio del funcionamiento del mercado de productos siderúrgicos 
(c.1900-c.1960), Doc. Trabajo 9806, Programa de Historia Económica 
Fundación Empresa Pública. 
24. Ministerio de Hacienda, Dirección General de Aduanas (1854), 
Estadística General del Comercio Exterior de España, Imprenta de D. 
Ramon Ballone a cargo de S. Baz; (1902), Establecimiento Tipográfico 
de J. Sastre y Compañía; y (1934), Sucesores de F. Peña Cruz, tomo 1.   
25. Nadal, J., dir., (2003),  Atlas de la industrialización de España 1750-
2000, Crítica. 
 35 
 26. Parsons, M.C. and Rose, M.B. (2004), “Communities of Knowledge: 
Entrepreneurship, Innovation and Networks in the British Outdoor Trade, 
1960-1990” Business History vol. 46, no. 4, pp. 609-639. 
27. Puigdomènec Tey, F.de P (1993), Historial de la industria metal.lúrgica 
Rivière 1835, 1854-1979,  Imprenta Tura Calàbria. 
28. Rivière Manén, F.L. (1954), Francisco Rivière 1835-1911. Intimidades 
de una empresa barcelonesa, Limonograph, 1954. 
29. Rose, M.B. (2000), Firms, Networks and Business Values: The British 
and American Cotton Industries since 1750 , Cambridge University 
Press. 
30. Sabel, C.F. and J. Zeitlin eds. (1997), World of Possibilities: Flexibility 
and Mass Production in Western Industrialization, Cambridge University 
Press. 
31. Sáez García, M.A. (2005), “Hacia un cartel perfecto. Los acuerdos 
colusivos en el sector siderúrgico español (1871-1907), Investigaciones 
de Historia Económica, no.1, 131-164. 
32. Sánchez, G. and Tascón, J., eds. (2003), Los empresarios de Franco. 
Política y economía en España, 1936-1957, Crítica. 
33. Scranton, Ph. (1997) Endless Novelty: Specialty Production and 
American Industrialization, 1865-1925, Princeton University Press. 
 36 
 34. Tirado Fabregat, D. (2002), “Economic Integration and Industrial 
Location: The case of Spain before World War I,” Journal of Economic 
Geography 2: 2312–21. 
35. Torres Villanueva, E. (2003), “Comportamientos empresariales en una 
economía intervenida: España, 1936-1957” in Sánchez. G. and Tascón, 
J., eds., Los empresarios de Franco. Política y economía en España, 
1936-1957, Crítica. 
 
 37 
